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OPEN FOR TROUBLE: AMENDING WASHINGTON’S 
OPEN PUBLIC MEETINGS ACT TO PRESERVE 
UNIVERSITY PATENT RIGHTS 
Vladimir Lozan 
Abstract: Times have changed. Science is no longer “a perfect working model of 
democracy,” so transparent that it does not need supervision by outsiders.1 Instead, science is 
now regulated at the federal and state level. At the federal level, laws and regulations require 
peer review meetings for research at state public universities to ensure compliance with 
federal funding mandates. At the state level, the Washington Open Public Meetings Act 
(OPMA) requires that peer review meetings at state universities be open to the public. When 
a scientist presents during one of these peer review meetings, the state university may lose 
patent rights because the presentation may contain intellectual property information that, 
once made public, forfeits patentability. This is certainly true for foreign patent rights and, in 
more limited circumstances, also true for rights under United States patent law. Though 
OPMA has exemptions that allow for closed sessions to discuss sensitive information, these 
exemptions do not encompass patent rights. This scheme conflicts not only with foreign and 
federal patent law goals, but also with the Washington Public Records Act (PRA). This 
Comment argues that OPMA should be amended to preserve a state university’s patent 
rights, consistent with patent law goals and the PRA. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Washington Open Public Meetings Act (OPMA) was enacted to 
promote government openness.2 OPMA requires that public agency 
meetings be open to the general public.3 This public meeting 
requirement applies to state public universities and their decisionmaking 
bodies.4 State universities hold a host of decisionmaking meetings, 
                                                     
1. See Sheila Jasanoff, Transparency in Public Science: Purposes, Reasons, Limits, 69 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 21, 23 (2006) (discussing Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science, 1 MINERVA 
54, 54–74 (1962); Roy Macleod, Science and Democracy: Historical Reflections on Present 
Discontents, 35 MINERVA 369 (1997)). 
2. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.010 (2010); Miller v. City of Tacoma, 138 Wash. 2d 318, 324, 979 
P.2d 429, 432–33 (1999). 
3. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.030; Miller, 138 Wash. 2d at 324–25, 979 P.2d at 433. 
4. See Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wash. 2d 243, 248, 884 P.2d 
592, 595 (1994) (“As the University noted at oral argument, the animal care committee meets 
pursuant to the Open Public Meetings Act of 1971, RCW 42.30 . . . .”); Cathcart v. Andersen, 85 
Wash. 2d 102, 104, 530 P.2d 313, 315 (1975); Refai v. Cent. Wash. Univ., 49 Wash. App. 1, 11, 
742 P.2d 137, 144 (1987) (showing Central Washington University did not dispute its status as a 
public agency). 
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including peer review meetings discussing scientific research, as 
mandated by federal law.5 During peer review meetings, a scientist may 
reveal sensitive information that, once made public, may jeopardize 
patentability6 both under foreign patent regimes and, in more limited 
circumstances, under U.S. law.7 
At state universities, the patents generated by research belong to the 
university under the Bayh–Dole Act.8 Since the enactment of the Bayh–
Dole Act, state universities have used patents as an extra source of 
funding and revenue by licensing or co-funding with the private sector.9 
This relationship not only helps secure private research funding but also 
bridges the gap between research and product commercialization.10 
Because of the financial value patent rights provide for public 
universities, some states completely exclude the public from any 
meetings related to state university research.11 Specifically, Ohio and 
Indiana have statutory schemes that extend intellectual property 
protection to their public meetings laws.12 Washington State provides 
some protection for intellectual property by exempting intellectual 
                                                     
5. See Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y, 125 Wash. 2d at 248, 884 P.2d at 595; Sean B. 
Seymore, The “Printed Publication” Bar After Klopfenstein: Has the Federal Circuit Changed the 
Way Professors Should Talk About Science?, 40 AKRON L. REV. 493, 510 (2007); Telephone 
Interview with Nona Phillips, Dir., Office of Animal Welfare, Univ. of Wash. (Jan. 22, 2009); cf. 
Cathcart, 85 Wash. 2d at 104, 530 P.2d at 315 (1975); Refai, 49 Wash. App. at 11, 742 P.2d at 144.  
6. Edwin S. Flores Troy, Comment, Publish and Perish: Patentability Aspects of Peer Review 
Misconduct, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 47, 48–49 (1996); see also Seymore, supra note 5, at 509–
10. 
7. See infra Part V.C. 
8. See 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006 & Supp. III 2010). 
9. See Letter from Sheldon Elliot Steinbach, Vice President & Gen. Counsel of the Am. Council 
on Educ., to Senator DeConcini, Chair of Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights & 
Trademarks (May 16, 1994), reprinted in The Bayh-Dole Act, A Review of Patent Issues in 
Federally Funded Research, Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. (1994))); Mary Eberle, Comment, March-in Rights 
Under the Bayh-Dole Act: Public Access to Federally Funded Research, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. 
REV. 155, 158–59 (1999) (citing The Bayh-Dole Act, A Review of Patent Issues in Federally Funded 
Research, Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights & Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 103d Cong. at 34 (1994) (written statement of Howard Bremer, the Ass’n of Univ. Tech. 
Managers & the Council on Governmental Relations)). 
10. See Pat Shockley, Comment, The Availability of “Trade Secret” Protection for University 
Research, 20 J.C. & U.L. 309, 309 (1994) (citing Michael Davis, Comment, University Research 
and the Wages of Commerce, 18 J.C. & U.L. 29, 34–36 (1991)). 
11. See, e.g., State ex rel. Besser v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 843 N.E.2d 174, 180–81 (Ohio 
2006) (describing how meetings were closed to the public while scientist at a state university 
discussed research results under an intellectual property exemption). 
12. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-1.5-6.1(b)(1), 5-14-3-4(a)(6) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 
2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 121.22(G)(5), 149.43(A)(1)(m) (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010). 
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property from disclosure under the Public Records Act (PRA).13 
However, this protection does not apply to public meetings governed by 
OPMA.14 OPMA allows the public to attend any research peer review 
meetings at a state university, even when sensitive patent material is 
being discussed.15 
This Comment argues that OPMA conflicts with the goals of foreign 
and domestic patent law. OPMA is also inconsistent with the PRA, 
which protects patentable material.16 Amending OPMA to protect patent 
rights at public universities is important in Washington, where the 
University of Washington receives the most federal funding out of any 
public institution in the nation—funding used for potentially patentable 
research.17 OPMA should be amended to parallel the intellectual 
property protections already provided by the PRA, similar to protective 
schemes in place in other states. 
Part I discusses how OPMA operates and how it affects state 
university research. Part II provides background on how OPMA 
undermines foreign patent rights. Part III provides background on the 
threat OPMA poses to domestic patent rights. Part IV discusses other 
state equivalents of OPMA, and the intellectual property protection they 
provide. Finally, Part V argues that OPMA should be amended. 
Amending OPMA is necessary to protect patent rights under foreign 
patent law as well as domestic law and to align OPMA with the goals of 
the Bayh–Dole Act. 
I. OPMA REQUIRES THAT PEER REVIEW MEETINGS AT 
PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES ARE OPEN TO THE PUBLIC 
The Washington Open Public Meetings Act (OPMA) requires that all 
public agencies and any other bodies with delegated decisionmaking 
power open their meetings to the general public.18 This public meeting 
                                                     
13. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.270(1) (2010). 
14. See id. § 42.30.110, particularly section 42.30.110(1)(l)–(n); see also infra Part V.A. 
15. See infra Parts I.B., V.A. 
16. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.270(1); Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y v. Univ. of Wash., 
125 Wash. 2d 243, 255, 884 P.2d 592, 599 (1994). 
17. Univ. of Wash. Office of Research, Summary of Sponsored Programs for the Fiscal Year 
Ending June 30, 2009, http://www.washington.edu/research/.SITEPARTS/.documents/.reportsGC 
Summary/01Prior_Years/05Summary_-_Fiscal_Year_2009.pdf, 13 (last visited Mar. 8, 2011). 
18. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.010 (“[T]he intent of this chapter [is that public agencies’] actions 
be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.”); Miller v. City of Tacoma, 138 
Wash. 2d 318, 324–25, 979 P.2d 429, 433 (1999) (discussing how action taken by a public agency 
must be at a public meeting). 
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requirement applies to peer review meetings at state universities like the 
University of Washington.19 
A. OPMA Requires that Public Agency Meetings Be Open to the 
Public 
The Washington State Legislature enacted OPMA in 1971.20 OPMA’s 
purpose is to promote openness in governmental actions and 
deliberations.21 The Legislature used strong language in OPMA to 
ensure it would be “liberally construed.”22 OPMA requires all public 
agency meetings to be open to the public.23 The statute broadly defines a 
public agency to cover most government entities at the state or local 
level.24 These public agencies must provide public notice of time and 
                                                     
19. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.030; Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y, 125 Wash. 2d at 248, 884 
P.2d at 595 (“As the University noted at oral argument, the animal care committee meets pursuant 
to the Open Public Meetings Act of 1971, RCW 42.30 . . . .”); Cathcart v. Andersen, 85 Wash. 2d 
102, 104, 530 P.2d 313, 315 (1975); Refai v. Cent. Wash. Univ., 49 Wash. App. 1, 11, 742 P.2d 
137, 144 (1987) (showing Central Washington University did not dispute its status as a public 
agency). 
20. Open Public Meetings Act, ch. 250, 1971 Wash. Sess. Laws 1113 (codified as amended at 
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.30.010–42.30.920). 
21. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.010 (“[T]he intent of this chapter [is that public agencies’] actions 
be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.”); Miller, 138 Wash. 2d at 324, 
979 P.2d at 432–33 (discussing how action taken by a public agency must be at a public meeting). 
22. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.910 (“The purposes of this chapter are hereby declared remedial 
and shall be liberally construed.”); see also Eugster v. City of Spokane, 110 Wash. App. 212, 222, 
39 P.3d 380, 384 (2002) (“[T]he statement of purpose in the OPMA ‘employs some of the strongest 
language used in any legislation[.]’”) (quoting Equitable Shipyards, Inc. v. State, 93 Wash. 2d 465, 
482, 611 P.2d 396, 406 (1980)). 
23. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.030; Miller, 138 Wash. 2d at 324–25, 979 P.2d at 433 (1999). 
24. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.020 (“(1) “Public agency” means: (a) Any state board, 
commission, committee, department, educational institution, or other state agency which is created 
by or pursuant to statute, other than courts and the legislature; (b) Any county, city, school district, 
special purpose district, or other municipal corporation or political subdivision of the state of 
Washington; (c) Any subagency of a public agency which is created by or pursuant to statute, 
ordinance, or other legislative act, including but not limited to planning commissions, library or 
park boards, commissions, and agencies; (d) Any policy group whose membership includes 
representatives of publicly owned utilities formed by or pursuant to the laws of this state when 
meeting together as or on behalf of participants who have contracted for the output of generating 
plants being planned or built by an operating agency.”); cf. Clarke v. Tri-Cities Animal Care & 
Control Shelter, 144 Wash. App. 185, 188, 181 P.3d 881, 882–83 (2008) (holding that a private 
corporation that received the bulk of its funding from taxpayer money and was subject to regular 
government oversight was the equivalent of a public agency under the Public Disclosure Act); 
Telford v. Thurston Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 95 Wash. App. 149, 165–66, 974 P.2d 886, 895 (1999) 
(holding that associations of public officials are public agencies under the Public Disclosure Act). 
Both the Open Public Meetings Act and the Public Disclosure Act serve the same purpose of 
promoting government openness. See Leslie L. Marshall, Note, Telford: Casting Sunlight on 
Shadow Governments—Limits to the Delegation of Government Power to Associations of Officials 
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place of their meetings that is annually published in the Washington 
state register.25 Regular meetings do not require an agenda or other 
description of the business to be transacted.26 
To help ensure that OPMA is followed, the law provides that any 
ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation, order, or directive adopted in 
secret or in violation of OPMA is void.27 A court can hold participants of 
a secret meeting personally liable and impose a civil fine.28 Ultimately, 
the purpose of OPMA is to safeguard the public’s ability to observe all 
steps of government decisionmaking.29 
B. OPMA Requires State Universities to Open Meetings to the Public, 
Including Peer Review Meetings 
Washington’s universities are public agencies and are subject to 
OPMA.30 As such, the meetings of state governing bodies must comply 
with OPMA.31 Further, some of these state governing bodies must also 
comply with federal laws in order to receive federal funding.32 
For instance, the Health Research Extension Act of 1985 requires that 
an Animal Care Committee (ACC) reviews and directs animal research 
                                                     
and Agencies, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 139, 140 (2000) (“In Washington State, the Public Disclosure 
Act and the Open Public Meetings Act, which are sometimes collectively referred to as the 
Sunshine Laws, open government agencies to full public view . . . .”); Teresa Dale Pupillo, Note, 
The Changing Weather Forecast: Government in the Sunshine in the 1990s—An Analysis of State 
Sunshine Laws, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1165, 1165 n.1 (1993). 
25. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.075. 
26. Hartman v. State Game Comm’n, 85 Wash. 2d 176, 181, 532 P2d 614, 617 (1975); Dorsten v. 
Port of Skagit Cnty., 32 Wash. App. 785, 789–90, 650 P2d 220, 223 (1982). However, other laws 
may pose additional requirements. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 35.23.221 (2010) (requiring 
public notice of hearings and meeting agendas for upcoming city council meetings). WASH. REV. 
CODE § 35A.12.160 (2010) is similar to WASH. REV. CODE § 35.23.221, but involves mayor-council 
plan of government. 
27. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.060; see Mason Cnty. v. Pub. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 
Teamsters Union, Local No. 378, 54 Wash. App. 36, 37–38, 771 P.2d 1185, 1186 (1989) (holding 
that the decision and agreement between a union and a county reached during a meeting that was 
conducted in violation of the Open Public Meetings Act are void). 
28. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.120(1). 
29. Cathcart v. Andersen, 85 Wash. 2d 102, 107, 530 P.2d 313, 316 (1975). 
30. Cathcart, 85 Wash. 2d at 104, 530 P.2d at 315 (1975); Refai v. Cent. Wash. Univ., 49 Wash. 
App. 1, 11, 742 P.2d 137, 144 (1987) (showing Central Washington University did not dispute it is 
a public agency). 
31. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.030; Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y v. Univ. of Wash., 125 
Wash. 2d 243, 248, 884 P.2d 592, 595 (1994) (“As the University noted at oral argument, the 
animal care committee meets pursuant to the Open Public Meetings Act of 1971, RCW 42.30 . . . .”) 
32. See Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y, 125 Wash. 2d at 248, 884 P.2d at 595. 
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in compliance with federal regulations.33 Scientists present their research 
to the ACC to help ensure federal compliance.34 The ACC is subject to 
OPMA.35 While the project review forms are designed to be generally 
disclosable36 and intellectual property can be further redacted in 
compliance with the Public Records Act,37 scientists may still be 
required to visually or orally present sensitive information—intellectual 
property—in order to answer questions targeted at candid peer review, 
which, in turn, helps ensure compliance with federal law.38 Even if 
federal compliance is not the reason behind the peer review meeting, 
these types of meetings are an essential part of the research process to 
evaluate merits of the research. These peer review meetings typically 
reveal confidential information.39 Even less formal presentations, such as 
“chalk talks,”40 can reveal such information.41 Publicly disclosing 
confidential information negates the novelty of an invention, a 
requirement for patentability.42 
                                                     
33. 42 U.S.C. § 289d(b)(3)(A) (2006). 
34. See Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y, 125 Wash. 2d at 248, 884 P.2d at 595. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.270(1) (2010); see infra Part IV.B. 
38. Seymore, supra note 5, at 510; Telephone Interview with Nona Phillips, Dir., Office of 
Animal Welfare, Univ. of Wash. (Jan. 22, 2009). 
39. Troy, supra note 6, at 48–49. 
40. A “chalk talk” is a lecture given with a piece of chalk and a clean blackboard (or a marker and 
a blank overhead transparency). The “chalk talk” is a “less formal” and “more interactive” talk 
which gives the speaker and the audience “more opportunity to explore ideas, direction of work, and 
some perspective of the field.” Jim Austin, You’ve Worked Hard to Get This Far, SCIENCE 
CAREERS (Nov. 22, 2002), http://sciencecareers.sciencemag.org/career_development/previous_ 
issues/articles/2030/you_ve_worked_hard_to_get_this_far/ (last visited Mar, 21, 2011) (explaining 
that a faculty candidate in a science department is often asked to give a “chalk talk” to a mock class 
as part of the on-campus interview). “Chalk talks” are invaluable during the question-and-answer 
portion of a seminar: 
In all of this we have ignored the one time-tested visual that has served scientific speakers for 
centuries: the blackboard. In many settings, there will, of course, be no blackboards. Where 
they are available, blackboards are most useful during the question and answer period that 
follows most talks. Then, blackboards are invaluable to draw new relationships, structures, and 
so on, that were not included in the talk but are needed to illustrate answers to questions from 
the audience. 
IVAN VALIELA, DOING SCIENCE: DESIGN, ANALYSIS, AND COMMUNICATION OF SCIENTIFIC 
RESEARCH 153–54 (2001). 
41. Seymore, supra note 5, at 509–10. 
42. See id. at 494–95 (“The § 102(b) printed publication bar terrifies university technology 
transfer offices because, in academic research, patentability and validity ‘can be derailed by the kind 
of disclosure that is a normal part of routine scientific discourse.’” (quoting Jeff Rothenberg, A 
Scientific Presentation Can Defeat Patentability, BUS. REV. (Dec. 2, 2005))), available at 
http://www.bizjournals.com/albany/stories/2005/12/05/smallb3.html?page=2; infra Part III.A. 
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II. PATENT RIGHTS ARE DESTROYED UNDER MOST 
FOREIGN PATENT LAWS ONCE AN INVENTION IS 
REVEALED PUBLICLY 
OPMA requires researchers at state universities to reveal their 
intellectual property to the public.43 Under most foreign patent laws, any 
public disclosure of intellectual property immediately destroys all patent 
rights to that property.44 As such, this public meeting requirement 
threatens the ability of those researchers to patent their intellectual 
property.45 
Most foreign patent laws address novelty differently than U.S. patent 
law.46 The critical distinction between foreign and domestic patent laws 
is their respective methods of recognizing an invention’s ownership.47 
The United States patent system follows a first-to-invent principle, 
whereby inventors may take up to one year after a public disclosure to 
file a patent for an invention they have created.48 All other countries 
                                                     
43. See supra Part I.B. 
44. See infra Part V.C.1. 
45. See infra Part V.C. 
46. See 3A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 10.01 (rev. ed. 2005); Ryan M. Corbett, 
Harmonization of U.S. and Foreign Patent Law and H.R. 2795: The Patent Reform Act of 2005, 18 
FLA. J. INT’L L. 717, 719 (2006) (“Almost every other country in the world employs a ‘first-to-file’ 
system, which grants priority to the first applicant who files a patent application for the invention, 
regardless of whether that applicant actually invented the device first.”); Toshiko Takenaka, The 
Best Patent Practice or Mere Compromise? A Review of the Current Draft of the Substantive Patent 
Law Treaty and A Proposal for A “First-to-Invent” Exception for Domestic Applicants, 11 TEX. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 259, 313 (2003); see also Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (Newman, J., concurring) (discussing applicants filing for foreign patents based of the first-
to-file rule); Erin Shinneman, Comment, Owning Global Knowledge: The Rise of Open Innovation 
and the Future of Patent Law, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 935, 953 (2010) (“The United States is the 
only patent-issuing nation in the world to maintain a first-to-invent priority system. . . . Outside the 
U.S., the first-to-file priority system grants the patent to the first applicant, regardless of whether he 
was actually the original inventor.” (citations omitted)). However, the actual practice of first-to-file 
systems is more complicated than that, with many countries utilizing limited grace periods. See 
Takenaka, supra at 313–14. 
47. See supra note 46. 
48. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(b) (2006); Corbett, supra note 46, at 719; see also 35 U.S.C. § 102(f), 
(g); Apotex USA, Inc. v. Merck & Co., Inc., 254 F.3d 1031, 1035 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Section 102(g) 
operates to ensure that a patent is awarded only to the ‘first’ inventor in law.”). All of the novelty 
and priority provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 102 are beyond the scope of this Comment. It should be noted 
that some scholars would argue that the complexity of the U.S. first-to-invent rules makes it more 
akin to a first-to-file system. See generally Toshiko Takenaka, Rethinking the United States First-to-
Invent Principle from A Comparative Law Perspective: A Proposal to Restructure § 102 Novelty 
and Priority Provisions, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 621 (2002); cf. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The U.S. First-to-
Invent System Has Provided No Advantage to Small Entities, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 
425, 428 (2002) (discussing that U.S. first-to-invent system potentially adds “hundreds of thousands 
of dollars” to the cost of patent prosecution.). 
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utilize a first-to-file system, where the first person to file gets the patent 
and any prior disclosure forfeits the patent rights.49 Because a majority 
of U.S. patent applicants are interested in securing patents outside the 
United States, most applicants have adopted a first-to-file practice.50 To 
comply with the first-to-file system, patent applicants may not publish or 
reveal their intellectual property in any way before the patent application 
is filed.51 
The European Community provides the most significant example of a 
first-to-file patent recognition scheme. Inventors seeking a foreign patent 
typically do so in Europe52 because the European Community is the 
world’s largest trading bloc.53 In this trading bloc, the European Patent 
Convention (EPC) has harmonized the patent laws of European Union 
Member States as well as other contracting states.54 With just one 
application, an inventor can obtain a “basket of national patents” with 
the desired member states.55 As of March 2011, the EPC had twenty-
seven European Union Member States, with nine candidate and potential 
candidate countries.56 Thus, while there are other ways to get patent 
protection in Europe,57 the EPC is a good framework for an exemplary 
analysis because of its popularity and breadth.58 
Under the EPC, the first-to-file principle is part of the novelty 
analysis to determine patentability.59 The EPC provides that an invention 
is novel if it is not encompassed by the “state of the art.”60 The “state of 
                                                     
49. See supra note 46. 
50. See Takenaka, supra note 46, at 301–02, 315. 
51. See infra notes 59–61 and accompanying text. 
52. GUY TRITTON, ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN EUROPE 61 (3d ed. 2008). 
53. Id. (largest trading bloc of the developed world). 
54. Id. at 49, 85–87. 
55. Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention), Art. 2(2), Oct. 
5, 1973, as amended Nov. 29, 2000, http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/ 
2010/e/ma1.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2011) [hereinafter European Patent Convention] (“The 
European patent shall, in each of the Contracting States for which it is granted, have the effect of 
and be subject to the same conditions as a national patent granted by that State, unless otherwise 
provided in this Convention.”); TRITTON, supra note 52, at 84; Andrew R. Sommer, Comment, 
Trouble on the Commons: A Lockean Justification for Patent Law Harmonization, 87 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 141, 144 (2005). 
56. See The 27 Member Countries of the European Union, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-
eu/member-countries/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2011). 
57. See TRITTON, supra note 52, at 215–220. 
58. See id. at 84–85, 217 (“[The European Patent Convention] has proved to be a very popular 
route for obtaining patents in Western European countries.”). 
59. See generally European Patent Convention, supra note 55, at art. 54. 
60. Id. at art. 54(1). 
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the art” is everything that is revealed to the public through public use, 
written or oral description, or “in any other way” before the filing date of 
the patent application.61 Thus, if an invention is revealed “in any other 
way” to the public before the filing date of the patent application, patent 
rights to that invention are destroyed. 
III. UNDER DOMESTIC PATENT LAW, PUBLIC DISCLOSURE 
OF AN INVENTION CAN THREATEN PATENT RIGHTS 
As discussed above, revealing an invention to the public threatens 
patent rights under the European Patent Convention and other important 
foreign patent laws.62 Under U.S. patent law, a public meeting’s threat to 
patent rights is less direct.63 While the EPC destroys patent rights as 
soon as an invention is disclosed to the public, U.S. law is more 
lenient.64 U.S. law grants a one-year grace period to file a patent 
application after an invention has been disclosed.65 Under U.S. law, this 
one-year clock starts to run as soon as (1) the invention has been 
disclosed in a printed publication, or (2) the invention is placed in public 
use.66 
A. A “Printed Publication” Need Not Be Printed, but Needs to Be 
Publicly Accessible 
Under U.S. patent law, inventors lose their patent rights when they 
describe an invention in a “printed publication” more than one year 
before filing a patent application.67 The rationale behind this prohibition 
is “that once an invention is in the public domain, it is no longer 
patentable by anyone.”68 A printed publication is formed when an 
inventor creates a “reference”—such as a paper, document presentation 
slide, or recording—that anticipates the eventual patent claims for the 
                                                     
61. Id. at art. 54(2). 
62. See supra Part II. 
63. See infra Part V.C.2. 
64. See supra Part II. 
65. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
66. Id. 
67. See id. 
68. In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing In re Bayer, 568 F.2d 1357, 1361 
(C.C.P.A. 1978)). 
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invention at issue.69 If the “reference” enables persons ordinarily skilled 
in the field to implement the invention without extensive 
experimentation, the “reference” is a “printed publication.”70 
The one-year clock to file a patent application actually starts when a 
printed publication has been “published.”71 Because a printed 
publication need not actually be printed,72 the date that the publication is 
“published” is the date it becomes “publicly accessible.”73 Public 
accessibility requires that “persons interested and ordinarily skilled in 
the subject matter or art” can locate the publication by “exercising 
reasonable diligence.”74 Evidence of someone actually locating the 
reference is not necessary.75 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has expanded the 
definition of “printed publication” to include visual presentations.76 In In 
re Klopfenstein,77 the Federal Circuit held that posters displayed at a 
trade show constituted a printed publication.78 The court listed four 
factors to determine when an ephemeral reference becomes a “printed 
publication”: (1) “length of time the display was exhibited,”79 (2) 
“expertise of the target audience,”80 (3) “existence (or lack thereof) of 
reasonable expectations that the material displayed would not be 
copied,”81 and (4) “the simplicity or ease with which the material 
                                                     
69. Verdegoal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“A [patent] 
claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly 
or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.”). 
70. See SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., 511 F.3d 1186, 1193–94 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
71. Id. at 1194 (quoting Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 
2006)). 
72. See generally In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
73. Hall, 781 F.2d at 898–99 (“Because there are many ways in which a reference may be 
disseminated to the interested public, ‘public accessibility’ has been called the touchstone in 
determining whether a reference constitutes a ‘printed publication’ bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).”); 
see also SRI Int’l, Inc., 511 F.3d at 1194; Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1348; In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 
1158, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 
1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
74. SRI Int’l Inc., 511 F.3d at 1194 (quoting Bruckelmyer, 445 F.3d at 1378); see also Kyocera 
Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 (2008). 
75. SRI Int’l Inc., 511 F.3d at 1197; Constant, 848 F.2d at 1569. 
76. See Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1350–52. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 1350. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
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displayed could have been copied.”82 This inquiry is approached on a 
case-by-case basis.83 
The Klopfenstein factors were developed to assess “public 
accessibility” from the perspective of a person ordinarily skilled in the 
art exercising reasonable diligence to locate the reference.84 Members of 
the public may vary from laypersons to those ordinarily skilled in the art 
and who are not bound by confidentiality.85 Attendance of persons 
ordinarily skilled in the art may make a presentation a printed 
publication, “‘however ephemeral its existence,’ . . .  if it ‘goes direct to 
those whose interests make them likely to observe and remember 
whatever it may contain that is new and useful.’”86 Simply being able to 
access unknown information by searching in a directory does not meet 
the “publicly accessible” element.87 
B. Public Use Can Be Negated by Experimental Use 
As discussed above, if an invention is disclosed in a “printed 
publication” more than one year before the patent application is filed, the 
inventor loses all patent rights to the invention.88 Likewise, if an inventor 
places an invention in “public use” more than one year before filing a 
patent application, the inventor loses all patent rights.89 Besides the 
inventor using the invention, public use also includes use by any other 
person who does not have an obligation of secrecy to the inventor.90 
                                                     
82. Id. 
83. Id. (citing In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1989)); In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899 
(Fed. Cir. 1986)).  
84. Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1348–50 (analyzing Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158; Hall, 781 F.2d 897; 
Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. AB Fortia, 774 F.2d 1104 (Fed. Cir. 1985); and In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221 
(C.C.P.A. 1981)). 
85. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.040 (2010) (“A member of the public shall not be required, as 
a condition to attendance at a meeting of a governing body, to register his name and other 
information, to complete a questionnaire, or otherwise to fulfill any condition precedent to his 
attendance.”). 
86. Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1351 (quoting Judge Learned Hand in Jockmus v. Leviton, 28 F.2d 
812, 813–14 (2d Cir. 1928)). 
87. See SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., 511 F.3d 1186, 1197–98 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
88. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
89. See id. 
90. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting In re Smith, 714 
F.2d 1127, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 336 (1881))). 
The policies behind public use include: 
(1) discouraging the removal, from the public domain, of inventions that the public reasonably 
has come to believe are freely available; (2) favoring the prompt and widespread disclosure of 
inventions; (3) allowing the inventor a reasonable amount of time following sales activity to 
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It is not public use when the inventor, or someone under the 
inventor’s control, uses the invention to bring it to perfection.91 Bringing 
the invention to perfection is considered to be “experimental,” not 
“public.”92 One commentator divided the elements of experimental use 
into three main categories:93 
(1) whether the use in question was primarily for the purpose of 
experimentation or commercial exploitation;94 (2) how much 
control the inventor exercised over the use;95 and (3) to what 
extent the invention needs further experimentation or testing in 
order to be complete.96 
Of these three factors, case law has uniformly shown that an inventor’s 
control of the invention’s use is the most important factor in determining 
whether the use is public or experimental.97 
                                                     
determine the potential economic value of a patent; and (4) prohibiting the inventor from 
commercially exploiting the invention for a period greater than the statutorily prescribed time.  
Lough, 86 F.3d at 1119 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198 
(Fed. Cir. 1994)). A court may consider additional factors based on the totality of the circumstances. 
Allied Colloids Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Baker Oil 
Tools, Inc. v. Geo Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). 
91. City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 134 (1877). 
92. Lough, 86 F.3d at 1120 (citing TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof’l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 971 
(Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
93. Eyal H. Barash, Comment, Experimental Uses, Patents, and Scientific Progress, 91 NW. U. L. 
REV. 667, 674 (1997). 
In Electromotive Division of General Motors Corp. v. Transportation Systems Division of General 
Electric Co., 417 F.3d 1203, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the Federal Circuit reiterated a more extensive 
list of thirteen objective factors to be considered: 
(1) the necessity for public testing; (2) the amount of control over the experiment retained by 
the inventor; (3) the nature of the invention; (4) the length of the test period; (5) whether 
payment was made; (6) whether there was a secrecy obligation; (7) whether records of the 
experiment were kept; (8) who conducted the experiment; (9) the degree of commercial 
exploitation during testing; (10) whether the invention reasonably requires evaluation under 
actual conditions of use; (11) whether testing was systematically performed; (12) whether the 
inventor continually monitored the invention during testing; and (13) the nature of the contacts 
made with potential customers. 
These were originally enumerated in Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1353 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing EZ Dock v. Schafer Sys., Inc., 276 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Linn, 
J., concurring))). 
94. Smith, 714 F.2d at 1134. 
95. In re Hamilton, 882 F.2d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
96. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 66–69 (1998). 
97. Electromotive Div. of Gen. Motors, 417 F.3d at 1214–15 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(“[C]ontrol . . . must be proven if experimentation is to be found.”); see also Netscape Commc’ns 
Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1320–21 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 
1113, 1121–22 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Allied Colloids Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co. 64 F.3d 1570, 1575 
(Fed. Cir. 1995); Beachcombers v. WildeWood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 F.3d 1154, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 
1994); Hamilton, 882 F.2d at 1581; Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1266 
(Fed. Cir. 1986); TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof’l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 972 (Fed. Cir. 1984); 
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An inventor controls the use of the invention if the inventor never 
uses the invention or never allows its use in any circumstance where the 
inventor lacks “a legitimate expectation of privacy and 
confidentiality.”98 Privacy and confidentiality are maintained where the 
inventor controls “the distribution of information concerning” the 
invention.99 Closeness and an ongoing relationship between the inventor 
and audience during a presentation do not necessarily determine 
control;100 instead, the circumstances under which the invention is 
disclosed determine the expectation of confidentiality.101 
For example, in TP Laboratories, Inc. v. Professional Positioners, 
Inc.,102 a dentist–inventor had used an orthodontic invention on his 
patients over the course of six years before filing for a patent 
application.103 The Federal Circuit recognized this limited use as 
“experimental,” not “public,” holding the patent to be valid.104 The court 
reasoned that the dentist–patient relationship was experimental use based 
on implied confidentiality, even though the patients most likely showed 
the invention to others who would understand and want to duplicate it.105 
However, if the inventor does not control the use of the invention, 
most uses will likely be held “public.”106 In Netscape Communications 
                                                     
Smith, 714 F.2d at 1136; Kock v. Quaker Oats Co., 681 F.2d 649, 655 (9th Cir. 1982); Omark 
Indus., Inc. v. Carlton Co., 652 F.2d 783, 787 (9th Cir. 1980); Dart Indus., Inc. v. E. I. DuPont 
DeNemours & Co., 489 F.2d 1359, 1366–67 (7th Cir. 1973); Cali v. E. Airlines, Inc., 442 F.2d 65, 
69 (2d Cir. 1971); Tool Research and Eng’g Corp. v. Honcor Corp., 367 F.2d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 
1966). The U.S. Supreme Court recognized this limitation very early in the public use 
jurisprudence. City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 135 (1877) (“So 
long as [the inventor] does not voluntarily allow others to make it and use it, and so long as it is not 
on sale for general use, he keeps the invention under his own control, and does not lose his title to a 
patent.”); Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 336 (1881) (“If an inventor, having made his device, 
gives or sells it to another, to be used by the donee or vendee, without limitation or restriction, or 
injunction of secrecy, and it is so used, such use is public . . . .”). 
98. Moleculon Research, 793 F.2d at 1265. 
99. Beachcombers, 31 F.3d at 1160 (discussing Moleculon Research, 793 F.2d 1261). 
100. Id. (concluding there was public use when the inventor displayed the invention at a private 
party and “notwithstanding the closeness and ongoing nature of [the inventor’s] relationship with 
her guests”). 
101. Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp., 26 F. Supp. 2d 492, 496–97 (W.D.N.Y. 1998); see also 
Moleculon Research, 793 F.2d at 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (concluding there was no public use “based 
on the personal relationships and surrounding circumstances” when the inventor presented fully 
functional prototypes of the invention to his friends and colleague at a university). 
102. 724 F.2d 965 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
103. Id. at 967–68. 
104. Id. at 972–73. 
105. Id. at 972. 
106. Netscape Commc’ns Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Baxter Int’l, 
Inc. v. Cobe Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1056, 1060–61 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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Corp. v. Konrad,107 the inventor “simply turn[ed] on the [invention] and 
let people try it out” without his presence.108 Because the inventor did 
not monitor the use of his invention, it was a public use.109 Similarly, in 
Baxter International, Inc. v. Cobe Laboratories, Inc.,110 the use was 
public when the inventor allowed another researcher to use the invention 
without the inventor’s control or oversight even though both worked in 
the same public laboratory.111 
Even if the inventor maintains control and is in the experimental 
stages with an invention, patentability of that invention is destroyed if 
the invention is disclosed in a printed publication.112 For example, in In 
re Hassler,113 the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
held that a newspaper article reporting the progress of experiments by an 
inventor and his colleagues was a printed publication under U.S. patent 
law.114 The court rejected the inventor’s argument that the publication 
should be exempt because the invention was in the experimental 
stages.115 Thus, not only does the inventor have to maintain control 
during experimental use, but also the invention cannot be disclosed in a 
printed publication.116 
IV. OTHER STATES’ OPEN PUBLIC MEETINGS STATUTES 
EXEMPT MEETINGS DISCUSSING PATENTABLE 
MATERIAL FROM BEING OPEN TO THE PUBLIC 
Washington is not the only state with an open public meetings law.117 
Unlike Washington, however, some of these other states exclude the 
public from meetings in which state university scientists discuss 
                                                     
107. 295 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
108. Netscape Commc’ns, 295 F.3d at 1322. 
109. Id. 
110. 88 F.3d 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
111. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 88 F.3d at 1056, 1060–61. 
112. In re Hassler, 347 F.2d 911, 912 (C.C.P.A. 1965); see also Pickering v. Holman, 459 F.2d 
403, 407 (9th Cir. 1972) (discussing Hassler with approval). 
113. 347 F.2d 911 (C.C.P.A. 1965). 
114. Hassler, 347 F.2d at 912; see also Pickering, 459 F.2d at 407 (discussing Hassler with 
approval). 
115. Hassler, 347 F.2d at 913; see also Pickering, 459 F.2d at 407 (“Any publication, regardless 
of the purposes behind it, violates the policies behind the publication bar. Publication pursuant to 
experiment is no exception.” (discussing Hassler)). 
116. Electromotive Div. of Gen. Motors Corp. v. Transp. Sys. Div. of Gen. Electric Co., 417 F.3d 
1203, 1214–15 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Hassler, 347 F.2d at 912–13. 
117. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010). 
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research.118  For example, Ohio and Indiana have written especially 
protective laws that help safeguard state university intellectual 
property.119 In these states, the public records and the open meetings 
laws work jointly to close meetings to the public in which university 
research is discussed.120 Though Washington’s public records law 
provides similar protections,121 Washington’s OPMA does not have an 
exemption to help safeguard state university intellectual property.122 
A. Ohio and Indiana Exempt Meetings Discussing Patentable 
Material from Their Public Meeting Requirement 
Other states have enacted statutory schemes that illustrate how to 
protect state university intellectual property.123 Ohio is an example of 
particularly strong protection; that state’s laws operate to completely bar 
the public from any meetings involving university research.124 Ohio’s 
open meetings law and Public Records Act working together protect 
intellectual property. Under Ohio’s open meetings law, a public body125 
can meet in “executive session”—completely closed to the public—any 
time the public body considers “[m]atters required to be kept 
confidential by . . . state statues.”126 Because the Ohio Public Records 
Act protects “intellectual property records,”127 the public meetings law 
                                                     
118. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 121.22(G)(5), 149.43(A)(1)(m) (LexisNexis 2007 & 
Supp. 2010); IND. CODE ANN. §§  5-14-1.5-6.1(b)(1), 5-15-3-4(a)(6) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 
2010); see also State ex rel. Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of 
Trs., 843 N.E.2d 174, 179–81 (Ohio 2006) (discussing that meetings were closed to the public while 
scientists at a state university discussed research results under an intellectual property exemption). 
119. See supra note 118. 
120. See Physicians Comm., 843 N.E.2d at 179–81 (discussing that meetings were closed to the 
public while scientists at a state university discussed research results under an intellectual property 
exemption). 
121. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.270(1) (2010). 
122. See infra Part V.A. 
123. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 149.43(A)(1)(m), (A)(1)(v), A(5); IND. CODE ANN. 
§§ 5-14-1.5-6.1(b)(1), 5-14-3-4(a)(6). 
124. See Physicians Comm., 843 N.E.2d at 180–81. 
125. “Public body” is defined as “[a]ny board, commission, committee, council, or similar 
decision-making body of a state agency, institution, or authority, and any legislative authority or 
board, commission, committee, council, agency, authority, or similar decision-making body of 
any . . . school district, or other political subdivision or local public institution.” OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 121.22(B)(1). 
126. Id. § 121.22(G)(5). 
127. Id. § 149.43(A)(1)(m). 
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allows professors at state universities to keep their peer review meetings 
private under the “state statutes” exemption.128 
The Supreme Court of Ohio has interpreted the Ohio Public Records 
Act’s “intellectual property records” protection to keep university 
research closed to the public.129 In State ex rel. Physicians Committee for 
Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State University Board of Trustees,130 the 
Court concluded that photographs, videos, and audio tapes documenting 
spinal-cord research using laboratory animals at Ohio State University 
were properly excluded under the intellectual property exemption.131 The 
Court reasoned that the meetings discussing this research were properly 
closed to the general public and that the research had not been “publicly 
released.”132 
Indiana has a statutory scheme similar to Ohio’s and is therefore 
likely to provide comparable protection for university research. 
Indiana’s public meetings law (Open Door Law) allows an executive 
session “[w]here authorized by federal or state statute.”133 Similar to 
Ohio’s intellectual property exemption,134 Indiana’s public records law 
exempts from disclosure “[i]nformation concerning research, including 
actual research documents, conducted under the auspices of an 
institution of higher education . . . .”135 Thus, just like in Physicians 
Committee,136 an Indiana court is likely to exempt state university 
research information and allow an executive session to discuss the 
material, especially because an Indiana court has already applied the 
research exemption of the public records law to research committees.137 
                                                     
128. Physicians Comm., 843 N.E.2d at 179–81. 
129. Id. 
130. 843 N.E.2d 174 (Ohio 2006). 
131. Id. at 179–81. 
132. Id. 
133. IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-6.1(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2010). 
134. See supra notes 125–28 and accompanying text. 
135. IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-3-4(a)(6).  
136. Physicians Comm., 843 N.E.2d at 179–81. 
137. Robinson v. Ind. Univ., 638 N.E.2d 435, 438–39 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). 
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B. Unlike Ohio and Indiana, Washington’s OPMA Does Not 
Incorporate the PRA Exemptions to Provide Executive Sessions to 
Discuss University Research 
Washington has recognized the importance of state university 
intellectual property.138 The Washington Public Records Act (PRA) 
exempts certain “proprietary information” from public disclosure, 
including “valuable formulae, designs, drawings, computer source code 
or object code, and research data obtained by any agency within five 
years of the request for disclosure when disclosure would produce 
private gain and public loss.”139 In Progressive Animal Welfare Society 
v. University of Washington,140 the Washington State Supreme Court 
reiterated that “[t]he clear purpose of the exemption is to prevent private 
persons from using the Act to appropriate potentially valuable 
intellectual property for private gain.”141 The Court approved a broad 
excision of data, hypotheses, and “other information” from documents 
the plaintiffs sought to obtain from the University of Washington 
Animal Care Committee (ACC).142 The Court pointed out that the 
redaction met the federal requirements of the Bayh–Dole Act and patent 
law to protect intellectual property.143 
However, this intellectual property protection is not found in 
Washington’s OPMA.144 In fact, not only does OPMA fail to provide a 
safety net allowing for executive sessions where other statutes prohibit 
disclosure,145 OPMA actually forecloses this option: “If any provision of 
                                                     
138. See Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y. v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wash. 2d 243, 265–66, 884 
P.2d 592, 605 (1994). 
139. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.270(1) (2010). 
140. 125 Wash. 2d 243, 884 P.2d 592 (1994). 
141. Id. at 255, 884 P.2d at 599; see also Tammy L. Lewis & Lisa A. Vincler, Storming the Ivory 
Tower: The Competing Interests of the Public’s Right to Know and Protecting the Integrity of 
University Research, 20 J.C. & U.L. 417, 425 (1994) (“[P]ublic disclosure law provides a 
mechanism through which ideas in grant proposals could be revealed and utilized by competitors, 
especially in fast-moving fields such as molecular biology.” (citing Rachel Nowak, FOIA: A 
License to Plagiarize Science?, 4 J. NIH RES. 27, 28–29 (Apr. 1992))). 
142. Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y., 125 Wash. 2d at 255, 884 P.2d at 599. The Court did not 
consider the issue of whether the ACC directly derived it authority from the Board of Regents or if 
it was a purely federal agency. The Court characterized the ACC as a state agency and dismissed 
any federal preemption claims under the Federal Freedom of Information Act. Id. at 266–67, 884 
P.2d at 605–06. 
143. Id. at 265–66, 605 (reasoning that the Washington PRA’s “proprietary information” 
exemption and the Bayh–Dole Act protect the same type of information). 
144. See infra Part V.A. 
145. See infra Part V.A.; cf. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.110 (2010). 
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this chapter conflicts with the provisions of any other statute, the 
provisions of this chapter shall control.”146 This seems in contrast with 
the PRA, which specifically exempts proprietary information such as 
“research data.”147 
V. THE WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE SHOULD 
AMEND OPMA TO PROTECT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
The Washington State Legislature should amend OPMA to protect 
intellectual property rights. Unlike legislation in states such as Ohio and 
Indiana, Washington’s OPMA does not include exemptions that 
adequately protect intellectual property disclosed at peer review 
meetings at state universities.148 Amending the law to include such 
exemptions would be consistent with the purpose of the Bayh–Dole 
Act.149 As such, the Legislature should amend OPMA to parallel states 
like Ohio and Indiana, thus protecting foreign and domestic patent 
rights. 
A. Current Exemptions to OPMA Do Not Protect Intellectual 
Property 
Like public meeting laws in Ohio and Indiana, Washington’s OPMA 
allows public agencies to exclude the public from public meetings using 
executive session exemptions.150 However, unlike the laws in those 
states, OPMA does not provide a blanket executive session exemption 
whenever disclosure would conflict with another state law.151 Instead, 
Washington’s OPMA lists a series of very specific exemptions from the 
public meeting requirement, none of which cover intellectual property at 
state universities.152 Because OPMA mandates a liberal construction, 
Washington courts infer a corresponding mandate that the exemptions be 
“narrowly confined.”153 
                                                     
146. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.140 (emphasis added). 
147. Id. § 42.56.270(1). 
148. See infra Part V.A. 
149. See infra Part V.B. 
150. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.110. 
151. Cf. id. § 42.30.110. 
152. See id. § 42.30.110. 
153. Miller v. City of Tacoma, 138 Wash. 2d 318, 324, 979 P.2d 429, 433 (1999) (quoting Mead 
Sch. Dist. v. Mead Educ. Ass’n, 85 Wash. 2d 140, 145, 530 P.2d 302, 305 (1975)). 
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As such, OPMA’s narrow exemptions do not encompass most 
university research.154 For instance, OPMA has a “health care services” 
exemption to allow public officials to hold executive sessions closed 
from the public in order to protect “proprietary or confidential 
nonpublished information.”155 While this language sounds protective of 
intellectual property, the exemption is limited to government contracts 
for goods and services156 and state-purchased health care services.157 
Contracts for goods and services do not typically encompass university 
research.158 Other specific exemptions in OPMA are similarly 
unprotective of intellectual property.159 
B. Amending OPMA to Protect University Research Would Be 
Consistent with the Bayh–Dole Act 
Congress enacted the Bayh–Dole Act in response to the recession of 
the 1970s and 1980s, attempting to exploit technological innovation as a 
national asset for economic benefit.160 Before the enactment of the 
                                                     
154. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.110, particularly section 42.30.110(1)(l)–(n). 
155. Id. § 42.30.110(1)(l). 
156. WASH. REV. CODE § 41.05.026(1) (2010). 
157. Id. § 41.05.026(2)–(4). 
158. A state university is not in the business of procuring goods and services. For instance, the 
University of Washington’s mission statement expounds, “The primary mission of the University of 
Washington is the preservation, advancement, and dissemination of knowledge.” UW Role and 
Mission Statement, UNIV. OF WASH., http://www.washington.edu/home/mission.html, (last visited 
Jan. 8, 2011); see also Wash. Research Project, Inc. v. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 504 F.2d 
238, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“[A] noncommercial scientist’s research design is not literally a trade 
secret or item of commercial information, for it defies common sense to pretend that the scientist is 
engaged in trade or commerce.”). 
159. Other exemptions within OPMA, including the “life sciences” exemption and the “health 
sciences” exemption are similarly not protective. The life sciences discovery fund exemption does 
not apply because it protects only private losses. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.110(1)(m). A state 
university cannot sustain private losses because it is a public agency. See Cathcart v. Andersen, 85 
Wash. 2d 102, 104, 530 P.2d 313, 315 (1975); Refai v. Cent. Wash. Univ., 49 Wash. App. 1, 11, 
742 P.2d 137, 144 (1987) (showing that Central Washington University did not dispute its public 
agency status). The health sciences and services exemption is also limited to protecting private 
losses. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.110(1)(n). 
160. Eberle, supra note 9, at 157 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 96-1307, Part I at 2 (1980), reprinted in 
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6461)). The policy and objectives of the Bayh–Dole Act are as follows:  
It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent system to promote the utilization 
of inventions arising from federally supported research or development; to encourage 
maximum participation of small business firms in federally supported research and 
development efforts; to promote collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit 
organizations, including universities; to ensure that inventions made by nonprofit organizations 
and small business firms are used in a manner to promote free competition and enterprise 
without unduly encumbering future research and discovery; to promote the commercialization 
and public availability of inventions made in the United States by United States industry and 
labor; to ensure that the Government obtains sufficient rights in federally supported inventions 
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Bayh–Dole Act, it took an average of fifteen to twenty years for 
published research to be incorporated into commercial products.161 This 
largely stemmed from private industry refusing to invest in 
commercializing research that did not provide market exclusivity.162 
The Bayh–Dole Act allows universities to retain title to patents that 
arose from federally funded research.163 The universities can then license 
these inventions to private industry.164 Under the Bayh–Dole Act, 
universities have successfully acquired patents in increasing numbers 
and the licensing of federally funded discoveries has increased.165 For 
these reasons, many consider the Bayh–Dole Act a success,166 so much 
so that other countries have enacted similar statutes.167 
Because of the Bayh–Dole Act, patents are a state university 
resource.168 When state university patent rights are threatened, the state 
and public stand to lose title to a valuable asset.169 In Washington, 
OPMA is undermining the assets of the very public it is designed to 
serve.170 As currently written, OPMA can cause state universities to lose 
licensing revenues on top of beneficial products not being 
commercialized.171 OPMA should be amended to explicitly incorporate 
the PRA exemptions to allow executive session for the preservation of 
state university intellectual property. Alternatively, at a minimum, 
                                                     
to meet the needs of the Government and protect the public against nonuse or unreasonable use 
of inventions; and to minimize the costs of administering policies in this area.  
35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006) (emphasis added). 
161. Margo A. Bagley, The Need for Speed (and Grace): Issues in A First-Inventor-to-File 
World, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1035, 1044–45 (2008) (citing generally David C. Mowery et al., 
IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY BEFORE AND 
AFTER THE BAYH–DOLE ACT 9-34 (2004)).  
162. Id. 
163. See 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006 & Supp. III 2010). 
164. See id. § 202(c)(7)(D), (E). 
165. Eberle, supra note 9, at 158–59. 
166.  Eberle, supra note 9, at 158; Takenaka, supra note 46, at 314–15. 
167. Renee E. Metzler, Comment, Not All Grace Periods Are Created Equal: Building A Grace 
Period from the Ground Up, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 371, 381 (2009) (citing John A. 
Tessensohn & Shusaku Yamamoto, Japan’s Novelty Grace Period Solves the Dilemma of ‘Publish 
and Perish’, 25 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 55, 55 (2007)); see generally Stephen W. Chen, 
Comment, Comparison of National Innovation Systems in China, Taiwan and Singapore: Is Bayh-
Dole One-Size That Fits All?, 2 TOMORROW’S TECH. TRANSFER 26 (2010). 
168. See 35 U.S.C. § 202(a). 
169. Cf. Eberle, supra note 9, at 158–59 (noting that the licensing of federally funded discoveries 
in the wake of the Bayh–Dole Act has garnered millions of dollars in royalties for some 
universities). 
170. See infra Part V.C. 
171. See infra Part V.C. 
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OPMA should have a safety net “other statute” provision that invokes 
the PRA exemptions.172 Ohio and Indiana statutory schemes provide 
good examples to follow.173 
C. Amending OPMA Would Protect Patent Rights Under Foreign Law 
and Extend Domestic Protection of Patent Rights 
Most foreign patent laws foreclose patentability when an invention is 
publicly disclosed.174 However, OPMA mandates public disclosure of an 
invention during peer review meetings at state universities.175 OPMA, 
therefore, destroys foreign patent rights.176 Further, in more limited 
circumstances, OPMA also destroys domestic patent rights.177 Even 
though a public peer review meeting is not a printed publication or a 
public use, OPMA allows a public member to create a printed 
publication that negates patentability.178 As such, OPMA should be 
amended to provide protection for foreign and domestic patent rights. 
1. Amending OPMA Would Protect Patent Rights Under Foreign Law 
Most foreign patent law recognition schemes sanction an inventor for 
disclosing information about an invention to the public.179 Because 
OPMA requires university researchers to disclose such information at 
peer review meetings, OPMA destroys foreign patent rights for inventors 
in Washington.180 For instance, under the European Patent Convention 
                                                     
172. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(G)(5) (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010) (Ohio’s open 
meetings law (Sunshine Law) allows an executive session to consider “matters required to be kept 
confidential by federal law or regulation or state statues.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-6.1(b)(1) 
(LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2010) (Indiana’s Open Door Law allows an executive session “where 
authorized by federal or state statute”). This would also bring OPMA in line with standard court 
procedures that exclude the public in order to protect sensitive information, where the stakes are 
arguably even higher than a public agency meeting. See Glenn A. Guarino, Annotation, Propriety of 
Federal Court’s Exclusion of Public from Criminal or Civil Trial in Order to Protect Trade Secrets, 
69 A.L.R. FED. 892 (1984 & Supp. 2010). For instance, in Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y. v. 
Univ. of Wash., 125 Wash. 2d 243, 884 P.2d 592 (1994), the Washington State Supreme Court 
performed an in camera review of the requested documents to protect potentially patentable 
information. Id. at 267, 605–06. 
173. See supra Part IV.A. 
174. See sources cited supra note 46.  
175. See supra Part I.B; infra Part V.C.1. 
176. See European Patent Convention, supra note 55, at art. 54; supra Part I.B. 
177. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); infra Part V.C.2. 
178. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b); infra Part V.C.2. 
179. See supra note 174. 
180. See European Patent Convention, supra note 55, at art. 54; supra Part I.B.  
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(EPC), a public peer review meeting is a public disclosure that negates 
novelty and forfeits patentability.181 While there are other ways to get 
foreign patent protection, even in Europe,182 the EPC is a good 
framework for an exemplary analysis because of its popularity and 
breadth.183 
The EPC novelty bar has exemptions that preserve patentability even 
if information about an invention becomes public. Particularly, the EPC 
allows for a six-month grace period under two exemptions to the general 
rule that public disclosure destroys patentability; however, this grace 
period is virtually meaningless when compared to the U.S. grace 
period.184 The first exemption requires that the disclosure be “an evident 
abuse of in relation to the applicant or his legal predecessor.”185 This is a 
narrow exemption because it requires a relationship between the 
patentee and the discloser.186 The second exemption requires that the 
disclosure be in the form of “display[ing] the invention at an official, or 
officially recognised, international exhibition falling within the terms of 
the Convention on international exhibitions . . . .”187 This is also a 
narrow exemption because there is typically not more than one 
exhibition a year and not even every year.188 
An OPMA public meeting would not qualify under the first abuse-of-
relation exemption because there is not a relationship between the 
inventor and public members.189 Likewise, an OPMA public meeting 
                                                     
181. See European Patent Convention, supra note 55, at art. 54(2) (negating novelty when the 
invention is disclosed through public use, written or oral description, or “in any other way” before 
the filing date of the patent application). 
182. See TRITTON, supra note 52, at 215–220. 
183. See id. at 84–85, 217 (“[The European Patent Convention] has proved to be a very popular 
route for obtaining patents in Western European countries.”). 
184. Bagley, supra note 161, at 1055. 
185. European Patent Convention, supra note 55, at art. 55(1)(a); see also TRITTON, supra note 
52, at 96–97. 
186. TRITTON, supra note 52, at 97. 
187. European Patent Convention, supra note 55, at art. 55(1)(b). 
188. For as list of past exhibitions, see Shanghai 2010, BUREAU INT’L DES EXPOSITIONS, 
http://www.bie-paris.org/site/en/library-a-publications/shanghai-2010.html, (last visited Nov. 13, 
2010); see also ALAN JOHNSON, CONCISE EUROPEAN PATENT LAW 50 (Richard Hacon et al. eds., 
2d ed. 2008); Metzler, supra note 167, at 398 n.188 (noting one officially recognized exhibition in 
2008 , none in 2009, and one slated for 2010).  
189. See TRITTON, supra note 52, at 97 (discussing that the requirement may “work hardship” as 
illustrated by a Technical Board of Appeal (TBA) holding where “a premature disclosure of an 
application of the closest prior art document by the Brazilian Patent Office was not an evident 
abuse . . . because there existed no relationship between the patentee and the Brazilian Patent Office 
and the disclosure was a mere error.” (citing Unilever PLC v. Bayer AG, T-585/92, 1996 E.P.O.R. 
579)). If a court will not find a relationship between a patentee and an entity that the patentee 
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would not qualify under the second international-exhibition exemption 
because peer review meetings at a state university will never be a 
recognized international exhibition.190 In addition, if a member of the 
public publishes a recording of the peer review meeting, that publication 
negates patentability because it will be a demonstration of the 
invention.191  In sum, unlike the more lenient grace period under 
domestic law, foreign patent law immediately forecloses patentability 
after the public meeting. Washington should amend OPMA to protect 
locally developed intellectual property from losing patentability 
overseas. 
2. Amending OPMA Would Also Protect Domestic Patent Rights from 
Members of the Public Creating Printed Publications 
A peer review meeting itself does not negate U.S. patent rights.192 
Domestic patent law discourages an inventor from disclosing an 
invention in a “printed publication” or placing it in “public use” more 
than one year before filing a patent application.193 However, a public 
peer review meeting is not a “printed publication” that would negate 
patentability.194 Likewise, a public peer review meeting does not place 
an invention in “public use.”195 Thus, the mere holding of a public peer 
review meeting itself does not threaten patent rights under U.S. law, but 
does allow a member of the public to create a printed publication. 
Under the “printed publication” bar, a peer review meeting is not 
“publicly accessible” and would not be a printed publication that forfeits 
                                                     
explicitly entrusts with her confidential material, then it is highly unlikely that a patentee will have 
any relationship with a member of the public attending an open public meeting. 
190. A public peer review at a state university is too small and occurs too often to be an 
international exhibition. Cf. Shanghai 2010, supra note 188 (discussing that the last expo that 
qualified as an international exhibition was over the course of many months at Shanghai, China, had 
participants from around the world, and focused on sustainable urban development); Metzler, supra 
note 167, at 398. 
191. European Patent Office, Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, 
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/1afc30805e91d074c125758a0051718a/$file
/guidelines_2009_complete_en.pdf, D-V, 3.1.1, (last visited Nov. 13, 2010) (making the invention 
available “by demonstrating an object or process in specialist training courses or on television” or 
“the exploitation of technical progress” constitutes prior art under EPO Article 54(2) as “made any 
other way”). Utilizing new technologies, such as podcasting, will count as public disclosures. 
JOHNSON, supra note 188, at 40. 
192. See infra notes 196–207 and accompanying text. 
193. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
194. See infra notes 196–202 and accompanying text. 
195. See infra notes 205–07 and accompanying text. 
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patent rights.196 Persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the art have 
access to only the time and place of the meeting.197 An interested 
member of the public, even if informed of an invention’s existence, 
would not know exactly at which meeting a potentially enabling 
presentation will be made.198 The available time and place of the 
meeting does not provide a meaningful catalog or index for an interested 
person to attend the right meeting.199 Sitting through many public 
meetings, waiting for a particular presentation, is unlikely to be 
“reasonable diligence”;200 nor is hoping to wander into the correct 
meeting.201 Thus, a court is unlikely to find that an enabling presentation 
at a public meeting is “publicly accessible” because an interested person 
ordinarily skilled in the art utilizing reasonable diligence would not be 
able to know when a presentation on a particular topic is occurring.202 
Nor would a peer review meeting place an invention into public use 
under the “public use” bar.203 Such meetings are analogous to a dentist’s 
                                                     
196. See infra notes 196–202 and accompanying text. 
197. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.075 (2010) (requiring only time and place of the meeting to 
be published in the Washington State Register). 
198. See SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., 511 F.3d 1186, 1195–98 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding no 
public accessibility even though anyone could have freely “wandered” onto the reference; the prior 
art was not “publicized or placed in front of the interested public” because File Transfer Protocol 
(FTP) knowledge of the subdirectory was required, equivalent to a “poster at an unpublicized 
conference without a conference index of the location of the various poster presentations”). 
199. See id.; In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding no printed publication 
because the thesis paper was catalogued in a library only under the author’s name and a customary 
search would not have yielded the paper where the thesis topic bore no relationship to the author’s 
name). 
200. See SRI Int’l, 511 F.3d at 1194 (stating public accessibility requires that “‘persons interested 
and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it’” 
(quoting Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006))); supra note 
198; see also Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
201. See SRI Int’l, 511 F.3d at 1197–98. 
202. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004), is not discussed here because it does not 
help guide the analysis. Its four-factor test for assessing public accessibility of a visual presentation, 
see supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text, is an inconclusive two-two tie when applied to a 
public peer review meeting. Factor one, the length of time displayed, will be relatively short 
compared to a tradeshow and falls against finding public accessibility. Factor two, the expertise of 
the intended audience, is high because the audience includes fellow colleagues; however, because 
the colleagues are bound by professional confidentiality, this factor falls against finding public 
accessibility.  Factor three, a reasonable expectation that the material displayed will not be copied, 
is absent at a public meeting and falls in favor of finding public accessibility. Factor four, the 
simplicity of copying the material displayed, is easy with a video camera that is allowed under 
OPMA and falls in favor of finding public accessibility. Because the factors split evenly, the four-
factor test is inconclusive. 
203. See infra notes 205–07 and accompanying text. 
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use of his invention on patients at issue in TP Laboratories,204 which the 
court deemed to be “experimental use.”205 Like the dentist–inventor 
benefitting from implied confidentiality that was part of the dentist–
patient relationship, an inventor presenting to his professional peers at a 
public peer review meeting does not need an express pledge of 
confidentiality.206 The public will almost certainly—“beyond reasonable 
probability”—observe or have the ability to observe the invention at the 
public meeting, but public presence does not necessarily negate 
experimental use.207 Thus, a court is likely to find a public peer review 
meeting to be an experimental use instead of a public use. 
In at least one narrow circumstance, however, an OPMA public 
review meeting could still threaten patent rights under U.S. law. While 
part of OPMA’s purpose is to allow members of the public to attend 
official meetings,208 there are exemptions.209 Currently, nothing in 
Washington’s OPMA prevents a member of the public attending a peer 
review meeting from recording that meeting with a video camera210 
Likewise, OPMA does not prohibit the member of the public from 
publishing the recording, by, for example, posting it on the Internet.211 
This posting will trigger the printed publication bar if the patent claims 
                                                     
204. TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof’l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
205. See id. at 967–73. 
206. Cordis Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (professional norms 
at a university support the expectations of confidentiality); see also TP Labs., 724 F.2d at 972. 
207. See Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (inventor 
showed fully working prototypes in at a university, yet maintained control over the invention 
without express confidentiality agreements); TP Labs., Inc., 724 F.2d at 972–73 (dentist used 
invention on patients without express confidentiality agreements, yet maintained control because of 
dentist–patient relationship despite the ability of the public to observe the invention); Xerox Corp. 
v. 3Com Corp., 26 F. Supp. 2d 492, 496–97 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (submission of how the invention 
worked for consideration to present at an international conference not public use because of 
expectation of professional confidentiality). But see Netscape Commc’ns Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 
1315, 1321–22 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (the inventor not maintaining oversight over the invention’s use 
constituted public use even though the invention was used at his work place). 
208. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.010 (2010) (“[T]he intent of this chapter [is that public agency] 
actions be taken openly and that [its] deliberations be conducted openly.”); Miller v. City of 
Tacoma, 138 Wash. 2d 318, 324, 979 P.2d 429, 432–33 (1999) (discussing how action taken by a 
public agency must be at a public meeting); Cathcart v. Andersen, 85 Wash. 2d 102, 107, 530 P.2d 
313, 316 (1975). 
209. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.110. 
210. See id. § 42.30.050 (allowing “representatives of the press or other news media” to attend a 
public meeting); Telephone Interview with Nona Phillips, Dir., Office of Animal Welfare, Univ. of 
Wash. (Jan. 22, 2009). 
211. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.050; cf. id. § 42.30.040 (attendance cannot be conditioned on 
any requirement of the public). 
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are anticipated.212 In re Hassler213 illustrates the point. In Hassler, the 
court held that a newspaper article that reported the progress of 
experiments by an inventor was a printed publication even though the 
invention was in the experimental stages.214 Once a printed publication 
exists for more than a year, patentability in the recorded invention is 
forfeited.215 OPMA should be amended to prevent members of the public 
from recording meetings at which patentable material is discussed, 
thereby threatening patent rights under domestic patent law. 
CONCLUSION 
OPMA allows executive sessions, which exclude the public from an 
otherwise public meeting, for limited purposes. These limited purposes 
do not typically allow for an executive session to protect state university 
intellectual property. As such, OPMA almost certainly undermines 
foreign patent rights. Further, the statute also conflicts with federal 
patent goals under the Bayh–Dole Act and is inconsistent with other 
Washington law, particularly the PRA because a member of the public 
can publish a video of the peer review meeting. Such a video may 
constitute a printed publication, foreclosing U.S. patentability. 
                                                     
212. See CA, Inc. v. Simple.com, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27092, 48–9 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (a 
reference posted on the internet is prior art); Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l., 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 95078, 28–9 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (posting a reference on the internet and indicating in 
forums to those interested in the art where to get a copy made the reference prior art). A public 
member creating prior art also raises the nonobviousness bar to patentability. 35 U.S.C. § 103 
(2006); see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 399 (2007) (citing Graham v. John 
Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966)). The nonobvious standard requires that the 
invention is an advance over the prior art, Graham, 383 U.S. at 14, which is compared to a 
combination of references or the prior art taken as a whole. In re Beattie, 974 F.2d 1309, 1312 (Fed. 
Cir.1992); In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1092, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Deep Welding, Inc. v. 
Sciaky Bros., Inc., 417 F.2d 1227, 1234 (7th Cir. 1969). Because obviousness involves looking at 
known elements, other patents, and knowledge of person having ordinary skill in the art “like pieces 
of a puzzle,” an exploration of it in the abstract is beyond the scope of this Comment. See KSR Int’l, 
550 U.S. at 402 (2007); 2, CHISUM, supra note 46, at § 5.01 (rev. ed. 2010) (“A patent monopoly 
may issue only for those literally new solutions that are beyond the grasp of the ordinary artisan 
who had a full understanding of the pertinent prior art.”) (emphasis added). However, it should be 
noted that this is an important issue, 2 CHISUM, supra note 46, at § 5.06 (rev. ed. 2010) (“The 
nonobviousness requirement of Section 103 is the most important and most litigated of the 
conditions of patentability.”), when a public member records and publishes a video of the meeting. 
213. 347 F.2d 911 (C.C.P.A. 1965). 
214. Hassler, 347 F.2d at 912–13; see Pickering v. Holman, 459 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1972) 
(“Any publication, regardless of the purposes behind it, violates the policies behind the publication 
bar. Publication pursuant to experiment is no exception.” (discussing Hassler)). 
215. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
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In Progressive Animal Welfare Society v. University of Washington, 
the Washington State Supreme Court sanctioned the redaction of 
documents requested under the PRA. The documents were redacted to 
exclude any potential intellectual property. The Washington State 
Legislature should amend OPMA to create intellectual property 
protections similar to those that exist under the PRA. This amendment 
would not result in the complete exclusion of the public from the details 
of state university research; instead, the public should be excluded only 
when potentially patentable material is being discussed. 
In high-stakes litigation, an infringing defendant will be motivated to 
great lengths to negate the novelty of a patent. If a Washington state 
university ever grapples in court with the issue of a public peer review 
meeting serving as prior art, it will be precisely because the patent is a 
valuable asset and is worth protecting. It is wasteful for Washington 
itself to undermine the validity of these valuable public patents. 
 
